ABSTRACT
To conduct our analysis, we construct a novel firm-level dataset that combines patent data and company financials. We match both SIPO Our results show that a tiny number of private Chinese companies, concentrated in the electronics industry, accounts for the largest share of the dramatic increase in USPTO patents held by Chinese residents. This selection also concerns the underlying technologies which are mostly related to electronics and semiconductors. The highly select group of Chinese firms seeking patent protection in the US also accounts for the overwhelming share of domestic SIPO patents despite there being a relatively larger number of companies across a wider range of industries obtaining patent protection with SIPO.
Our objective is thus to analyse whether this small group of firms responsible for the dramatic increase in Chinese patenting represents the spearhead of a larger group of Chinese companies, poised to lead the Chinese economy to a wider technological take-off; or whether it merely reflects an exceptional, highly select group of firms, potentially supported by public policy, that is unlikely to represent a broader underlying technological leap among Chinese companies. Our analysis, therefore, informs on the broader debate over China's innovative prowess and potential development path, which may be based either on a 'Red Queen' run, which regards Chinese firms' ability to stay close to the world technology frontier and to improve upon and adapt existing innovation as key to its continued growth (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011) , or the need for the domestic development of genuinely novel product innovation that pushes the global technology frontier to avoid getting caught in a 'middle income trap' (The Economist, 25th June 2011).
Analysing the patenting decision and patent productivity for a sub-sample of years we find that there is a significant difference in the firm characteristics associated with patenting an innovation with both SIPO and USPTO in comparison with merely patenting with SIPO. We find that firms which fall into the former category tend to be younger, considerably more export-oriented and larger than their peers which only patent in China. This result is evident in both the analysis of the decision to patent in any one year as well as in that of the patent count. We interpret our findings as evidence for the patent explosion being largely the result of increased patenting by very few companies in the information technology equipment industry. These relatively young companies managed to grow extremely fast in size within few years and succeeded placing themselves into leading positions in global production chains. Our analysis of their patented inventions indicates that these companies are undertaking a myriad of different innovative activities, including product innovation albeit of a relatively low-tech character. These companies also account for the lion's share in domestic patenting with SIPO, despite there being a much broader range of companies in a number of different industries patenting domestically. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that the patent explosion does not reflect a general technological take-off, but the success of an extremely small group of firms within a single industry.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature on government innovation policy and patenting in China and charts recent innovation effort. Section 3 discusses institutional differences of the patent systems in China and the US which have a bearing on firms' decisions to patent in these jurisdictions. Section 4 discusses the construction of our dataset. Section 5 explains our empirical strategy. Sections 6 and 7 discuss some descriptive evidence and our analytical results respectively. Section 8 offers some brief concluding thoughts.
Literature & Background
In this section, we cover innovation policy in China, provide some descriptives on broad measures of innovation effort over the past decade and discuss the existing empirical literature on patenting activity by Chinese firms, distinguishing aggregate economy, provincial-level and firm-level data. The latter has thus far been hampered by difficulties arising from matching Chinese firm-level data with official patent data, effectively limiting analysis to self-reported patent applications -a problem we overcome in the present study.
Innovation Policy
The analysis here is undertaken against the background of a pro-active innovation policy on behalf of the government of a developmental state. As is well-documented (Fischer and von Zedtwitz, 2004; Naughton, 2007; Hu and Jefferson, 2008 ), China's state-driven innovation policy began with a relatively high 'technology effort' (relatively high R&D to GDP ratio) during the socialist period, albeit one which supported 'episodic' prestige innovations with limited economic relevance (e.g. the development of nuclear weapons or the successful launch of a man-made satellite). Following the pro-market reforms of the late 1970s, it was not until the mid-1980s that a more sophisticated government innovation system, which allocated research funding based on competitive tender, was introduced (the so-called '86-3 program'). Among the stated aims of this policy was the intention "to achieve 'leap-frog' development in key high-tech fields" (MOST, 2011a). Around the same time research institutes were actively encouraged to collaborate with business enterprises and spin-off successful ventures into quasi-private entities -a process which created some of the foremost technology firms in China today (e.g. Founder, Tongfang, Legend). Subsequent technology and innovation policy expanded the focus to cover 'basic research' and reflects the recognition that successful innovation is necessarily built on a substantial talent base (so-called '97-3 program'; MOST, 2011b).
The 97-3 program is at least in part responsible for the improvements in the human capital base, which saw the number of university graduates in engineering roughly double between 1999 and 2005, although these courses are not all comparable to undergraduate degrees in the US or Europe.
In general terms the innovation policy described thus far focused primarily on state-owned entities, and in particular research institutes and universities -business enterprises (state-owned, foreign or private domestic) did not feature prominently (Naughton, 2007; Hu and Mathews, 2008) .
As a striking reminder of the distance China's economic development has covered over a relatively short period of time, it was not until the late 1990s that any state support related to technology and innovation was extended to private firms and startups (Naughton, 2007: 361) . Thus this period represents the first instance in China's recent economic history when state-owned and private enterprises enjoyed a level playing field in terms of state support for technology and innovation (e.g. tax breaks, subsidised credit). Crucially, the equal treatment of enterprises in innovation policy was ef-4 fectively extended to foreign-invested enterprises operating in the Middle Kingdom around the same time (Naughton, 2007: 366) . Private property rights for homeowners and businesses were not fully guaranteed by the law until October 2007, on the one hand forcing entrepreneurs into complex private-public or foreign joint ventures in order to conduct business legally while on the other fostering a concentration on short-run profits, to the detriment of time-consuming innovation efforts (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011) . Even in the present day the laws surrounding investment are said to be murky and the The Economist magazine concludes that " [o] wnership is rarely straightforward in China" (9th July, 2011).
An explicit desire among the central government officials to transform the country from an imitator to an innovator economy was stated in the 2006-2010 5-year plan, which targeted 2015 as the year in which to achieve this goal (Hu and Jefferson, 2008: 288) . As a result local governments, which jostle with each other for increased domestic and foreign investment, are argued to act under the impression that "virtually any action they take in support of high-technology industry and technological development will be acceptable" (Naughton, 2007: 368 ).
Innovation Effort
Simple aggregates for R&D expenditure by sector indicate how the late 1990s became a gamechanger for Chinese innovation effort: in 1997, 42.7% of the national R&D expenditure was spent by business enterprises, in subsequent years this share rose to 44.7% (1998), 49.7% (1999) and
60.2% (2000), reaching 69.1% by 2006 (MOST, various).
In Figure 1 we provide some macro evidence for the rapid changes apparent in China's innovation effort over our sample period. Apart from China, we highlight the US, Japan, Korea as representative OECD countries which China aims to emulate in terms of innovation activity. The top graph for 1999 indicates that among 71 developing and developed countries China's R&D intensity (around 0.8%) was relatively unremarkable, somewhat above countries at a similar level of development but certainly not an outlier. 5 The graph for 2007 (for 74 countries) indicates that a mere 8 years later the picture has changed quite substantially, with R&D intensity at 1.5% equivalent to that in countries twice her average per capita income.
A second shift in China's innovation activity can be seen in Table 1 , where we report the abovementioned share of national R&D expenditures accounted for by business enterprises, again for the years 1999 and 2007. As a means of comparison we provide data for a number of OECD countries as well as emerging economies, but (this is particularly important with regard to the 'ranking') the choice of countries covered is not meant to be representative of all OECD and/or emerging economies. In 1999, around half the R&D expenditure in China was accounted for by business enterprises, putting them toward the bottom of this group of 11 countries, alongside with Turkey, Argentina and Mexico. By 2007 the business share had risen to over 70%, thus placing China firmly in line with top OECD innovators such as Japan, Korea, the US or Germany. Note that with the exception of Mexico the figures for other emerging economies remained relatively stable over this time period.
In conclusion, whether or not this effort has resulted in a boost to domestic innovation (of the novel product type) the above numbers plot an impressive sea-change in China's innovation activity between the late 1990s and the present day. 5 We stress again that China's development was unusual in that the R&D to GDP ratio was substantially higher during the socialist period ending in the late 1970s. Although a relatively high level of innovative effort was maintained during the early 1980s the R&D to GDP ratio eventually came down to 'standard' developing country levels around the mid-1990s. 5 
Patenting
The existing literature on patenting in China is surprisingly sparse. While there are some studies at the aggregate (Hu and Mathews, 2008) , industry (Hu, 2010) and province level (Sun, 2000; Cheung and Lin, 2004; Yueh, 2009) , there is little work at the firm-level (Hu and Jefferson, 2009 ).
Moreover, the existing work at the firm-level relies on firms' self-reported patents due to a lack of actual patent information (Hu and Jefferson, 2009 ). The existing literature, so far, has focused mostly on the effect of technology transfer on the performance of Chinese firms (Hu et al., 2005) as well as the patenting activity of foreign relative to domestic firms in China (Hu, 2010 (machinery), 24 (chemicals), and 32 (telecommunications equipment) to have by far the largest number of patents in China. Patenting by foreign residents in China is found to be driven by import competition, that is, foreign patenting is positively correlated with the amount imported by China from technologically similar industries of other foreign countries. This finding is corroborated by the fact that over 90% of patent applications by foreign firms claim a foreign priority.
An early study on the spatial concentration of patenting by Sun (2000) investigated provincelevel data for 1985-1995 -the period before FDI or private enterprise made substantial impact on Chinese development in general and with regards to innovation activities in particular. It is thus not surprising that the output from collective and state-owned enterprises was found to be an important force in innovation output and overall the relative level of provincial development seeming to drive the empirical results. 6 All R&D activity measured for this study was limited to universities and 'government R&D institutes', again a reflection of the scarcity of business enterprise R&D at the time. Employing provincial data from 1995 to 2000, Cheung and Lin (2004) 
USPTO vs SIPO
This section examines differences between the patent systems in the US and China which may have implications for the ability and motivation of Chinese firms to seek patent protection in each country. Since our analysis focuses on invention (SIPO) and utility (USPTO) patents, our discussion here is limited to this type of patents. 9 Sorell ( Regarding the application process, a fundamental difference is the first-to-file rule applied by SIPO compared to the first-to-invent rule at the USPTO. 10 In addition, the USPTO has a one-year grace period to determine prior art, i.e., an invention may still be patentable despite having been 8 More generally, their analysis of innovation activity in private enterprises is somewhat hampered by the time period under analysis, 1995-2001: it is argued elsewhere that many of the incentives for technology development and innovation were not extended to private enterprises and start-ups until 1999 (Naughton, 2007: 361) , such that their analysis only captures one or two years of the 'level playing field' between state-owned and private enterprises. 9 USPTO 'utility' patents correspond to SIPO invention patents and must not be confused with SIPO utility patents. A SIPO utility patent is not subject to substantive examination. 10 In the US, whoever demonstrates to have invented the invention first is entitled to the patent whereas in China, the individual that files the patent application first is entitled to the patent.
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published for example in a trade journal during the 12 months preceding the patent application, while there is no such provision in China. Moreover, until recently, SIPO granted patents for inventions that were not necessarily 'new-to-the-world': before the third amendment to the Chinese Patent Law in 2009, Article 22.2 defined prior art excluding inventions known to the public or in public use outside of China. For example, while a patent publication in the US did represent prior art preventing the granting of a patent in China, if in contrast the invention had been known or used by someone other than the inventor (without obligation of secrecy) in the US, it would still have been patentable in China. Yang (2008) points out that in the examination process, different emphasis is put on the 'industrial applicability' criterion. That is, whereas the USPTO has a broad interpretation of the potential practical purpose an invention might serve, SIPO requires some form of demonstrable industrial applicability. This is related to a broader issue regarding patentable subject matter. The US patent system has been criticized for allowing a broad range of inventions to be patented that may contain only limited technological advance, including software, business models and even DNA segments (Gallini, 2002; van Pottelsberghe, 2010) . SIPO in contrast, applies a narrower definition of what constitutes patentable subject matter, more in line with the stance of the European Patent Office (EPO). There are also some differences in the legal provisions in case an application is rejected and the applicant wishes to request re-examination, but these appear to be of less relevance to our analysis and are therefore not discussed here. Similarly, there are considerable differences in patent enforcement and validity disputes between the US and China, which are not discussed here (for more details see Sorell, 2002) . Of more direct relevance is the fact that the US does not require foreign applicants to have a patent agent in the US, whereas SIPO requires foreign applicants without residence in China to rely on a domestic patent agent designated by SIPO to handle the application process. Foreign applicants for patents in the US may nevertheless be compelled to rely on the services of a US patent attorney because there usually is a considerable amount of exchange of information between an applicant (or his patent attorney) and the USPTO during the examination process.
From an empirical point of view, Yang (2008) finds no difference in pendency between domestic and foreign applicants in the US and grant times to be shorter in China than the US (on average two as opposed to three years). In addition, she finds the ratio of grants to applications to be higher in the US than China, while the grant rate is considerably higher for domestic applicants in both China and the US.
The fee structure also differs between the USPTO and SIPO. In China, an application costs CNY 900 (The exchange rate between 2002 and 2005 is around US$ 1=8.27 CNY, so this amounts to around US$ 110), there is an additional examination fee of CNY 2,500 (US$ 300) and maintenance fees of CNY 300 (US$ 35) every five years. At the USPTO the basic application fee is US$ 330 and examination fees amount to US$ 220. 11 At the USPTO, renewal fees are not payable annually:
at 3.5 years, the maintenance fees due amount to US$ 980, at 7.5 years to US$ 2,480 and at 11.5 years to US$ 4,110. 12 Additional costs for Chinese firms arise from the need to translate the patent application into English. If a Chinese applicant relies on the services of a US patent attorney, although not formally required by the USPTO, substantial additional costs arise. Hence, the numbers suggest that obtaining and maintaining patent protection in the US is considerably more expensive in the US than China. However, the largest difference in the cost of obtaining patent protection in 11 Fees for small firms are half the normal fee. See http://tinyurl.com/66xb774 (USPTO website). 12 Small entities pay half the standard fee.
8 the US for Chinese firms stems from the need to translate the patent application and to potentially hire a US patent attorney who administers the patent application. The data used for our analysis consists of three components. The first component contains our firm-level information, the second component consists of USPTO and SIPO patent data and the third component is a 'bridge' that links the firm-level data with the patent information. These three components are discussed in turn below.
Data

Firm-level Data
Our firm-level data come from China's Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) compiled by the NBS. Firms contained in ASIE include the whole population of state-owned firms as well as all non-state-owned companies with annual sales above CNY 5 million (around $600,000). On average, more than 200,000 firms are included each year and they account for around 95% of total Chinese industrial output and 98% of industrial exports, covering 39 two-digit industries, of which 30 belong to manufacturing industries, spread across all 31 provinces and municipalities.
The available data cover the period 1999-2006, including more than 2 million observations from about 590,000 firms. 15 The key variables relevant to our study include a unique firm identifier, R&D expenditure (limited coverage), exports, type of ownership registration, the structure of paidin capital distinguished by investor types (government; foreign investors excluding Hong Kong, 13 The International Patent Classification (IPC), established by the Strasbourg Agreement 1971, provides for a hierarchical system of language independent symbols for the classification of patents and utility models according to the different areas of technology to which they pertain (WIPO, 2011).
14 For example the UK Community Innovation Survey 3 (2001) contains the following question 'How many patents, if any, did your enterprise apply for during the period 1998 to 2000?' The question refers to a three-year range, which makes it difficult to allocate patents into specific years to match annual firm-level data. In any case, cross-checking firms' responses to this question with their actual patent holdings indicates that only about 30% of firms that report to have applied for a patent actually did so.
Macao, and Taiwan; investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors), output, sales, employment, fixed assets, and industry affiliation. 16 
Patent Data
The patent data come from the European Patent Office's (EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) version October 2010. 17 We extract patents filed by Chinese residents at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and those published directly by the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO). 18 Our analysis focuses on the application date of a patent. However, patent data are only visible after a patent has been published which implies that although we use the application date, our sample of patents is limited to patents that have already been published. Given the usual 18-month delay between application and publication date at both USPTO and SIPO, 19 this implies that we have patent data up to March 2009 at best. This is not restricting our analysis given that our firm-level data is only available to 2006. 
Matching
Due to the absence of a unique identifier shared by the firm-level and patent data, the main problem in constructing our dataset consists in matching patents to firms. This is generally challenging for a 17 PATSTAT combines patent information from several sources: DocDB (the EPO master bibliographic database containing abstracts and citations), PRS (the patent register for legal data), EPASYS (the database for EP patent grant procedure data), and the EPO patent register as well as the USPTO patent database for names and addresses of applicants and inventors. 18 This includes patents filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) through the PCT route. 19 The USPTO may not automatically publish an application 18 months after its priority date if requested by the applicant provided the invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in another country or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires publication of applications eighteen months after filing (35 U.S.C. 122(b) and §1.211). Hence, if a Chinese applicant patents an invention with the USPTO that he also patents with SIPO, the application will be published within 18 months 20 Note that we have patent data since 1985, but firm-level information is only available since 1999. The patent data preceding 1999 is used in our descriptive analysis as well as to construct patent stocks. 21 See http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/ORIANA.aspx data; for example, Oriana does not report firms' R&D expenditure nor ownership structure (in terms of paid-in capital contributed by different types of investors following Guariglia et al., 2011) .
While this approach allows us for the first time to match patent data to Chinese firms, it also has some limitations. First, Oriana only contains a subset of the firms contained in the census. However,
given that Oriana is a subset of ASIE, we can test for differences between the distributions of our variables of interest between Oriana and the full ASIE sample (see Section 4.4). Second, names in PATSTAT as well Oriana might nevertheless differ according to whether names have simply been transcribed using pinyin or (partly) translated. The main challenge in matching the two datasets, therefore, consists in creating an automated matching algorithm that copes with this difficulty as manual matching is unfeasible due to the large number of Chinese patents. Due to the similarity of firm names, 22 probability-based matching does not seem appropriate in the present context due to the relatively higher risk of obtaining a large number of 'false positive' matches, i.e., patents erroneously matched to firms. 23 Instead we clean and standardize firm names in both datasets to a maximum possible to avoid the occurrence of 'false negatives'. We also cross-check matched USPTO and SIPO patents using 'equivalents': we verify whether for example a given matched USPTO patent has a SIPO equivalent for the same innovation to ensure that the SIPO equivalent is allocated to the same company. 24 In addition, in the case of USPTO patents, we checked all matched and unmatched firms manually. Due to the dramatically larger number of SIPO patents, we only checked a subsample of matched and unmatched patents. 25 In case we found 'false negatives', we amended the corresponding standardisation code of our matching algorithm in order to ensure our match is easily reproducible. 26 An Appendix explains the matching algorithm in more detail (see also Table   3 ).
Data Cleaning
The The sample used in the regression analysis therefore contains 64,652 firm-year observations from 19,956 firms (see Table 2 ). All variables employed in the regression analysis are discussed in detail in Section 5 below. Note that for our descriptive analysis of patenting in Section 6, we make use of 22 Chinese firm names frequently contain the city or province in which the firm is located. Furthermore, detailed description of the firm status (co. ltd. is often written out in detail as youxian gongsi or even youxian zeren gongsi) adds to the sense of similarity. Finally, the Chinese language only contains around 400 syllables which further hinders reliable matching by name. 23 See Thoma et al. (2010) for a recent review of probabilistic matching. 24 We verify whether the equivalent found in this way contains the same assignee name as the matched patent. 25 In the case of USPTO patents, this meant searching for approximately 1,370 unmatched assignee names manually in Oriana and in the case of SIPO patents, we searched for about 10% of the approximately 22,500 unmatched Oriana names among the approximately 145,000 unmatched SIPO assignee names. 26 In case of USPTO and SIPO patents, we found a share of only about 2% of 'false negatives' in the assignee names.
11 the entire data span for which we have patent data which covers the period 1985 to 2006.
Finally, in order to verify potential sample selection issues due to the use of ASIE companies that are contained in Oriana, we ran some empirical tests to analyse the differences between the wider ASIE sample excluding firms in our sample (around 780,000 observations) and the ASIE-Oriana sample (around 65,000 observations). The results are summarised in Table TA -VI.
Empirical Strategy
In the present paper we investigate two main research questions employing our integrated dataset:
(i) 'What drives the recent 'explosion' in patent applications from firms registered in China?' (Q1:
patenting versus not patenting), and (ii) ' Are there any differences in the determinants of Chinese firms' patent productivity between the US and China?' (Q2: patenting productivity). We will endeavour to provide support for the results from the descriptive analysis in Section 6 through a number of alternative empirical models.
We begin with the patenting question, Q1, whereby we essentially disregard the number of patents taken out by a firm and focus merely on the prevalence of patenting. We first employ a multinomial logit model, which allows us to analyse the 'discrete choice' over patenting alternatives (do not patent, in China/US only, in both countries -the former is the omitted alternative in the regression) and to investigate the firm characteristics that influence this choice across the alternatives (Agresti, 1990; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . Following estimation we evaluate the model by comparing predicted and empirical frequencies across alternatives, by investigating the null hypothesis that coefficients for each covariate are zero across all four alternatives and furthermore by analysing LR tests for combination of alternatives (i.e., asking for instance whether we can combine the 'patent in China only' with the 'patent in both China and the US' alternative). Finally we interpret the results using percentage changes in the odds across different alternatives. 27 In this and all of the following empirical models we use a standard set of characteristics/determinants -see below for a detailed discussion of these covariates.
Next we employ a bivariate probit model to analyse two dichotomous outcomes, namely patenting with USPTO and patenting with SIPO. The joint outcomes can then be analysed using a simple correlation coefficient (ρ) between the two outcomes; the statistical significance of ρ may either reflect the jointness of the decision to patent in both countries or unobserved factors common to both decisions (Anand and Khanna, 2000), i.e., model misspecification. Furthermore we test the hypothesis that separate probit models fit the data better than the joint model and conduct parameter homogeneity testing across the two equations, which can potentially indicate differences in the impact of covariates on the patenting decision. Perhaps the most interesting element of the bivariate probit analysis is the visual comparison of predicted probabilities: here we first compute the predicted probabilities for each of the four possible outcomes 28 and then plot them against various covariates of interest (firm size, export-sales ratio, firm age) using fractional polynomial regression to indicate the general tendency. Our focus here is on the firms which only patent in China con- 27 The interpretation of these results is as follows: by how many percent will the odds of having a patent alter when increasing the x variable by one unit. The comparison with the omitted base outcome 'no patent' can just be interpreted as simple changes in the odds for a unit increase in the covariate, whereas in the comparison of the alternative outcomes the percent changes are relative. This multinomial logit analysis is conducted making extensive use of the routines and examples provided in Long and Freese (2006) . 28 1: no patents, 2: patents in China only, 3: patents in the US only, 4: patents in both the US and China.
trasted with those which also patent in the US. 29 We further provide a set of descriptive statistics relating to firm characteristics and sectoral characteristics of the observations making up the four different outcomes.
A final set of results then moves on to analyse patenting productivity, Q2, using count data models by estimating standard patent production functions which relate the patent count (the 'product') to a vector of firm-level characteristics (the 'inputs'). In a single cross-section the work by Bound et al. More recent applications have further concerned themselves with the issue of 'excess zeros' in count data, although this phenomenon is intimately linked to overdispersion given that both may arise from unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2006) . In order to distinguish the 'innovating firms' which chose not to patent in year t from firms which never innovate and therefore never patent (these are labelled 'certain zeros') 'zero-inflated' versions of the Poisson (ZIP) and Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimators (Lambert, 1992; Winkelmann, 2003) first estimate a nonlinear (logit or probit) model for 'certain zeros' and then analyse those observations which are predicted not to be 'certain zeros' in a count regression model (Poisson or Negative Binomial). 31 Since the estimation approach is maximum likelihood-based each of the two steps is iterated until the respective 'best fit' is achieved. In the present data context the large number of zero patents and thus the use of the 'zero-inflated' versions of count data estimators is arguably more important than in the standard approaches using US or OECD data (Hu and Jefferson, 2009 ): for the USPTO data we have a mere 68 non-zero observations (0.11% of the sample), whereas for the SIPO data the figure is 922
(1.43%). Given the uncertainty over any differences in the determinants of the patenting decision ('inflation' equation) and the patenting productivity ('count data' equation) we follow the standard in the literature by including the same covariates in both equations (Lambert, 1992; Winkelmann, 2003) .
In a panel context the standard count data modelling approach is to follow Hausman et al.
(1984) by adopting a fixed or random effects Poisson regression, rather than the above 'cross-section' estimators, since the former allow for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. In the present case of China, however, the use of dedicated panel estimators accounting for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level would dramatically reduce the sample size, since only firms with at least one patent over the sample period could be considered. We therefore treat our panel as repeated cross-sections, in the spirit of previous work on China by Hu and Jefferson (2009 29 Note that using data for firms that only patent in the US reduces the sample to a handful of firms. 30 Overdispersion is manifest in many count data models whereby the variance of the count variable is often substantially larger than its mean. 31 Note that the inflation model defines the logit regression in reverse ('certain zero'=1, not 'certain zero'=0) to a standard logit model (no patent=0, some patents=1), such that we can expect the reverse signs in the former compared with the latter.
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Bin vs. ZINB), as well as various information criteria discussed in Long and Freese (2006) . Patent production function results for SIPO and USPTO patents are relegated to a technical appendix -in the main section we present our preferred estimates from the Negative Binomial model, where we estimate the equations for USPTO and SIPO in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework.
This allows us to conduct parameter homogeneity tests across models akin to the analysis in the bivariate probit model (we refer to this as 'correlated NegBin').
In the following we briefly discuss the choice of covariates employed in the empirical analysis.
The firm-level characteristics considered in this analysis follow the suggestions in Hall and Ziedonis (2001), namely measures for R&D expenditure (innovation effort), firm size, firm age, as well as some characteristics with particular relevance for China, namely firm ownership type and export orientation (export-sales ratio). We employ R&D expenditure deflated by employment (in logs), adding a dummy variable for firms with no data on R&D expenditure (about 1.7% of observations) and a dummy for firms with zero R&D expenditure (about 70% of observations); in both cases we set log R&D per worker to zero. We chose this specification to avoid confounding the R&D effect with that of the size of the firm (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 ), which is measured by employment (in logs) and meant to capture possible economies of scale in the production of patents. Log R&D expenditure per worker is entered as linear and squared terms to allow for firms at different tails of the distribution to impact patenting decisions and patent count differentially. Firm age is computed from data on the year the company was founded. In an OECD country context this variable is China's strong reliance on manufacturing for export we include export orientation constructed as annual export value over total sales in our regressions. With the exception of dummy variables all of the above are in logarithms. Finally, we add year dummies to all our models which will allow us to chart the increase in patenting both with USPTO and SIPO, accounting for any unobserved effects that impact all firms in our sample such as the 2001 amendment to the Chinese patent law.
Note further that our empirics concentrate primarily on 'consistency' (in the plain English sense of the word) in the sign and statistical significance of these covariates across the different empirical models tested. In all empirical models we cluster standard errors at the firm-level. Tables 4 and 5 ; six companies appear in both lists, with four of these in 3C industries.
It is also noteworthy that these top patenting companies are very large and most of them highly export oriented. Going through the profiles of the companies listed in Tables 4 and 5 , we find that, apart from two companies (LG Shanghai and Inventec) in Table 5 , all companies employ more than 3,000 workers, with some gigantic companies such as Sinopec, Baoshan Iron & Steel and Huawei employing more than 100,000 workers. It is also not very surprising that most of the firms turn out to be heavily engaged in exporting. According to the Ministry of Commerce, except for three companies (BYD, LG Shanghai and Fuzhun), all of the companies in Tables 4 and 5 Apart from asking who patents, the question of what is patented is equally important. We classify USPTO and SIPO patents according to the type of innovation that they protect: 35 product patent documents, whereas in the case of SIPO patents we rely on a subsample of 980 patents due to the fact that claims are not readily available but must be retrieved from the original patent documents which are available only in Chinese. Table 6 shows a breakdown of USPTO and SIPO patents according to the innovation type that they protect. For USPTO patents, Table 6 shows that nearly half of all patents filed by Chinese residents cover product innovations. Only about 20% of patents cover process innovations. The pattern looks different in the case of SIPO patents (excluding USPTO equivalents): nearly 37% of patents protect process innovations and slightly less than 30% cover product innovations. The share of patents protecting both product and process innovations remains approximately the same as for USPTO patents. The last two columns of Table 6 show the distribution of innovation type when we add USPTO equivalents to the SIPO patents. 37 We use sample weights in computing shares to reflect the small proportion of SIPO patents with USPTO equivalents (2.5%) among all SIPO patents. The results change very little relative to the distribution when looking only at SIPO patents. In brief, Table 6 suggests that inventions that are patented in Similar to USPTO patents, it appears that process patents and those protecting both products and processes related to the ICT sector are of more innovative character.
Finally, Tables 7 and 8 contain information on the sample of firms used in our regression analysis.
As previously discussed, due to the limited availability of R&D data, the sample collapses to about 64,500 firm-year observations. The table underscores our findings from Tables 4 and 5 , 36 An example for a product innovation is a chemical compound whereas a process innovation protects for instance the method to produce the compound. This example also illustrates how a patent can protect both a product and process innovation: it covers both the compound and its production method. 37 This means we add those USPTO patents that have a SIPO equivalent for which we have not examined the claims. This assumes, that equivalents protect the same innovation type, which may not necessarily hold in all cases.
that is, the overwhelming share of patents is filed by companies in the ICT equipment industry where few companies account for most patents as indicated by the standard deviation and maximum. Table   8 offers descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis which is discussed next in Section 7.
Results
It should be noted from the onset that the present data poses fundamental challenges to the empirical estimators typically employed in patent decision and patenting productivity analysis: in particular for the analysis of USPTO patents, where we only have a minute share of firm-years which have non-zero observations (amounting to 0.11% of observations). We rely in parts on the predictive power of the models (compared with the true outcomes observed) and employ various tests and robustness checks. Specifically in order to address the low share of non-zero observations we employ 'rare events' methods (King and Zeng, 2001a,b) in a technical appendix and find no evidence to suggest that our models investigating the patenting decision (Q1) are substantially distorted by this data property. In order to address the same issue in the patenting productivity analysis (Q2) we employ a number of 'zero-deflated' count regression models which in terms of diagnostics however seem to be somewhat inferior in to the Negative Binomial model presented below (in the ZINB case this is inferiority is arguably marginal). All of our empirical analysis is, therefore, in the spirit of trying to paint a broad brush picture of the differences in the patenting decision and factors that seem to correlate with high patenting count arising from all the below regressions whilst not relying too heavily on any single empirical method employed.
Patenting decision
We begin our discussion with the empirical results for the patenting decision, Q1, for which we provide analysis from a multinomial logit model in Table 9 and from a bivariate probit model in Table 10 , together with plots for predicted probabilities and various descriptive statistics in Figure 2 and Tables 11 and 12.   Table 9 shows estimates for patenting in China only (column [1] ), in the US only ( [2] ) and in both countries ( [3] ) in comparison to the omitted reference alternative not to patent at all.
The predicted probabilities for each of the three alternatives, presented at the bottom of the table, are close to the observed probabilities while the tests for combination of any of the above categories/alternatives, also presented toward the bottom of the table, rejects in all cases at the 1% level of significance -this provides some indication that we can distinguish these alternatives empirically and that the empirical model has a certain goodness of fit. The independence tests presented in the column to the right of the three equation results suggest that with the exception of firm-ownership none of the covariates are zero across all three equations, thus indicating our set of covariates has explanatory power in the patent decision analysis. In the right half of the table we present the percentage changes in the odds by moving between groups -here we only present results for differences between alternatives which are statistically significant at the 10% level. As we will show below, the group of firms patenting with 'USPTO only' is very small whilst merely accounting for a handful of patents. We therefore focus primarily on the results comparing the groups of firms patenting in China only and patenting in both China and the US ( [3] 
vs. [1]).
Investigating the empirical estimates for the three equations more closely we can see that R&D expenditure has a consistent positive effect on patenting, convex with regards to the 'SIPO only' and 'both' alternatives, thus suggesting that firms with very large R&D intensity populate both of these groups. The relationship seems much stronger for the group of firms that patent in both China and the US, as is also confirmed by our 'Changes in the Odds' analysis. Firm size seems to boost patenting propensity in all three groups. Export intensity has a particularly divisive effect, whereby firms with higher export-sales ratio have a higher propensity to patent in the US -whether they also patent in China or not. A doubling of the export-sales ratio implies a 75% increase in the odds to patent in both countries relative to in China alone. Focusing just on the firms which exclusively patent in China, a doubling of the export-sales ratio will reduce the odds to patent by 11%. With regards to firm age it can be seen that older firms are less likely to patent in the US. Finally, while the patent explosion is clearly discernable for the 'China only' group the difference to the bulk of the remaining firms which do patent (most of which are contained in the 'both' group) is not found to be statistically significant at the 10% level except for the final year.
A first tentative conclusion from this analysis is that differences in the R&D intensity, firm age and in particular export intensity seem to drive firm's decisions to patent abroad vis-à-vis exclusively in China. Surprisingly, firm ownership as defined here does not seem to have any discernable impact on the patenting choice. Table 10 reports results for a bivariate probit regression, analysing the patenting decisions of firms (simple dummy variable) in a joint empirical model. For the USPTO equation we have around 0.11% of observations with patents, for the SIPO equation around 1.43%. With regard to the regression results, we limit ourselves to discussing the signs and statistical significance of covariates, as well as the result from cross-equation parameter homogeneity tests. The latter are carried out both for individual variables (column marked 'Indiv.') and groups of variables (' Joint', with the symbols indicating variable groupings). We furthermore compute predicted probabilities and correlate these with some of the key covariates of interest, using nonlinear (fractional polynomial) regression (95% confidence intervals are indicated): this analysis is presented in Figure 2 , where the left plot always refers to the predicted probability of patenting only in China, whereas the right plot refers to the predicted probability of also patenting in the US. In all plots we limit the analysis to firms which do have a patent in either China or the US -results are much more precise if we used the entire sample of firms but we prefer to compare firms that do patent to highlight the difference in their characteristics.
Analysing the results in some more detail, a test for independence between the two probit equations rejects emphatically, indicating a high level of correlation between the decision to patent in the US and in China. Parameter homogeneity tests indicate a marginally significant difference in R&D intensity (R&D expenditure per worker, in logs, and its square term) between the USPTO and SIPO patenting decisions, with both indicating a statistically significant positive and convex relationship. As the first row of plots in Figure 2 indicates this is a minor difference in the shape of the innovation effort-patenting relationship between the 'SIPO only' and 'both countries' groups. For firm size (workers, in logs), we find an increased propensity to patent with size in both equations, although more so for the USPTO equation, hence the rejection in the parameter homogeneity tests -as our second set of plots in Figure 2 indicates this is again a minor difference in degrees, rather than a fundamental difference between the two patenting decisions. The results with regard to export orientation are much more pronounced: the bivariate probit coefficients are negative significant for SIPO and positive significant for USPTO. The suggested importance of export orientation for the patenting decision is illustrated rather starkly when we compare the predicted probabilities in the third row of Figure 2 : with increasing export-intensity the propensity of patenting only in China decreases markedly, whereas the propensity of patenting in both countries rises steadily before a turning point at around 60% export intensity. Related to this, the dummy variable indicating zero exports (around 43% of observations) is positive significant (albeit marginally so) in the SIPO equation. The homogeneity test for firm age (in logs) rejects at the 1% level, with the variable insignificant for the SIPO and negative significant for the USPTO equations, respectively. Although the plots in the bottom row of Figure 2 show some noise in the tails of the age distribution of firms, it is nevertheless indicative that age seems to be positively related with patenting exclusively at SIPO, whereas the relationship appears unrelated or even negative for the USPTO patenting predictions.
Interestingly, firm ownership does not differentiate the patenting decision, whether analysed jointly of for individual ownership types. Finally, the comparison of the year dummies quite clearly shows the 'explosion' in patenting at SIPO over the sample period, whereas this effect is much less marked in the USPTO equation.
In Tables 11 and 12 we present descriptive statistics and details on sector of operation for each of the four patenting 'groups' (SIPO only, USPTO only, no patents, both SIPO and USPTO) respectively.
We discuss group medians except for the binary variables where we use the mean. From the top right panel of firm characteristics in Table 11 it is quite clear that the 'USPTO only' group is a very marginal one, made up of only 32 firm-year observations during our 4 sample years; the 'patent stock' statistics indicate that these firms previously had submitted patents to SIPO, just not in our four sample years. We therefore concentrate on the comparison of the three other groups, beginning with the 'China only' versus the 'China and US' group in the top left and bottom right panels of the table respectively. The latter group is made up of 150 firm-year observations, whereas the former amounts to 2,200. Firm-level characteristics for the 'China and US' group are noticeably different: R&D per worker is double that for the 'China only' group, export intensity a staggering 7 times, while the firm size is around 70% larger; median age is 14 years for 'China only' versus 9 years for 'China and US' groups. Foreign as well as state-owned enterprises are represented more prominently in the 'China and US' group. Comparing the 'China only' with the 'never patent' group in the bottom left panel, it can be seen that the latter group's median R&D per worker is zero while that for the former is CNY 700 per worker, with median firm size the only other characteristic which differs substantially: 'China only' firms are roughly double the size of 'never patent' firms. Table 12 In summary, this analysis confirms our previous finding that patenting with USPTO relative to SIPO in our regression sample is primarily associated with younger, more export-oriented firms and 38 As suggested before the 'US only' group is rather insubstantial (less than 2% of all USPTO patents).
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to a lesser extent with firm size. While R&D investment clearly matters for patenting, there does not seem to be a substantive difference here between the two patenting decisions, while (as in the previous analysis) ownership type does not seem to impact the patenting choice.
Patent productivity
We now turn to the empirical analysis of patenting productivity, Q2, which is analysed using count regression models. Detailed results for USPTO and SIPO patenting from a number of alternative estimation methods are presented in Tables TA-II to TA-III in a technical appendix with predicted probabilities for all count data models detailed in Table TA Turning to the covariates employed in both models, parameter homogeneity tests suggest that the R&D effort is not associated differentially with patenting with USPTO and SIPO -in both cases the relationship between patenting and R&D intensity is suggested to be convex. Firm size is positive significant in both equations, however the parameter homogeneity test suggests that size matters more for USPTO patenting -this is not surprising, given that our above discussion has revealed that the vast majority of USPTO patents are taken out by a small number of very large global ICT equipment manufacturers. The results for export intensity follow the same pattern as our analysis of the patenting decision: USPTO patent productivity is positively associated with export intensity whereas the correlation is negative for SIPO patenting, with a parameter homogeneity test rejecting emphatically. Firm age is negatively correlated with patent count in both equations, but the association is stronger in the USPTO case, leading to a rejection of parameter homogeneity at the 5% level. In contrast to the previous analysis of the patenting decision firm ownership type is now found to be statistically different in its impact on patent productivity with USPTO and SIPO.
Closer analysis however establishes that this result is primarily driven by the 'Other' category, such that we do not attach too much attention to this finding. It is, however, notable that foreign-invested firms, both from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao as well as from other countries, are significantly positively associated with the patent count, indicating that foreign firms may be more 'productive' conditional on all other factors. An alternative interpretation would suggest that these firms benefit from additional R&D facilities owned by the multinational and can thus not be compared like for like with indigenous firms. Another simpler explanation would be that the HMT foreign-ownership variable captures a 'Foxconn effect'. Finally, the joint analysis of parameters on the year dummies suggests no statistically significant difference between SIPO and USPTO patenting 'explosions' -as can be seen, the failure to reject any difference is primarily driven by the large standard errors of 39 In summary, this second analysis focused on patent productivity has revealed very similar patterns to our earlier study of the patenting decision. In broad terms, we have found a number of standard covariates statistically significantly associated with higher patent counts. In terms of our comparison of patenting in China and patenting in the US we found the export intensity, firm age and firm size of particular importance in distinguishing USPTO patent count from SIPO patent count.
This analysis suggests that firms associated with USPTO patenting are larger, younger and more export-oriented than their peers associated with SIPO patenting. Caution is however needed in arguing for the robustness of these results: while broadly speaking qualitatively similar to the results just discussed (in terms of signs and magnitudes) the 'correlated ZINB' count regression equation
could not establish statistical significance in the difference of many of the covariates between the USPTO and SIPO equations, due to the imprecision of estimates in the former.
Conclusion
What is behind the recent Chinese patent explosion? Is China transitioning fast from imitating technology to producing genuine innovation? What impact does the patent explosion have on the Chinese economy and on the rest of the world?
While answers to these questions are of immediate concern to policy makers in China and beyond, their empirical investigation has to date been severely hampered by data limitations: there were no data available for Chinese firms that included companies' actual patents filings. We overcome this constraint and construct a dataset that contains domestic (SIPO) as well as US (USPTO)
patent filings by about 20,000 manufacturing firms registered in China. We employ the data to investigate the factors behind the Chinese patent explosion during the period 1999-2006.
Our answer to the first question is unambiguous: a handful of companies in the ICT equipment sector account for the overwhelming share of patents, where this high concentration is even more pronounced in USPTO filings. These companies are very large, relatively young, more R&D intensive, and strongly export oriented, in short, true global players. For these companies, a substantial share of patents covers product innovation albeit of relatively low-tech character. Process innovations and combinations of product and process innovation covered by patents held by these companies appear to be technologically more innovative and potentially valuable. Hence, our results tentatively suggest that these few, highly patent-active companies are not merely 'innovation castles in the air' inflated by Chinese public policy directed at increased patenting, but (at least to some extent) innovative companies highly integrated into the global economy.
Does this imply, there is evidence for wider technological take-off among Chinese companies?
Our analysis suggests that the answer is most likely negative; patenting is concentrated in very few industries and even within these few industries undertaken by very few albeit highly active
companies. Yet, this conclusion is subject to the caveat that our sample covers only about 20,000 manufacturing companies. Referring back to our introductory remarks on the 'Red Queen Run' vs.
the 'Middle Income Trap' arguments, our analysis suggests that reality most likely lies between these two extremes. Contrary to a genuine 'Red-Queen Run,' a number of Chinese companies appear to be truly innovative, potentially even pushing the technology frontier beyond China. At the same time,
there are very few such companies, and some of the most active among them are foreign-invested.
generation of 'new-to-the-world' innovation.
What is the likely impact of the patent explosion? In our view, it points to China becoming an economy that competes not only on cheap labour and sheer scale, but also in terms of innovation.
However, not unlike other successful Asian economies, there are very few such companies driving this development.
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Figure 1: R&D intensity (in % of GDP) across countries (1999, 2007) Notes: We plot gross domestic expenditure on R&D (in percent) against the level of development (proxied by GDP pc, in logarithms). These data come from the UNESCO UIS and the Penn World Table 7 Note: Chinese GB/T 3 digit industry code in brackets. Note: Chinese GB/T 3 digit industry code in brackets. Notes: n = 64, 652 observations for N = 19, 956 firms. The omitted category is [0] -no patents (98.53% predicted probability, 98.53% true probability). † We only report the differences between alternatives which are statistically significant at the 10% level. Each column head indicates which two alternatives are tested. We report the %age change for a unit increase (for dummy variables discrete change) in the independent variable (%age change from moving between alternatives, e.g. [1] v. [0] from group without patents to group with patents at SIPO). Note that we do not report the results for missing R&D. ‡ Wald test for the effect of independent variables, which has the H 0 that all coefficients associated with a given variable are zero. Here we also tested (in separate tests) the R&D expenditure, the ownership type and year dummy variables variables jointly, which rejected the null for all four tests at the 1% level (ownership type at the 5% level). LR test for combining alternatives, which has the H 0 that all coefficients (except for the intercept) associated with a pair of alternatives are 0 (i.e. the two alternatives could be combined). The data covers the years for which R&D expenditure is available (2001, 2002, 2005, 2006 ). Notes: n = 64, 652 observations for N = 19, 956 firms. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. ρ indicates the interrelatedness of the two probit models estimated jointly. Note that the bivariate probit model (SUR) assumes that the model is correctly specified -a model misspecification (omitted variable in both equations) may cause the interrelatedness evident in a statistically significant ρ. We test the null of parameter homogeneity across the two probit regressions, with results presented in the column marked 'individual'. Joint tests for groups of variables are indicated by the same symbol with results reported in the final column. The omitted base year is 2001, the omitted ownership category 'state-owned'. The data covers the years for which R&D expenditure is available (2001, 2002, 2005, 2006 ).
Figure 2: Predicted Patenting Probabilities
Notes: Plots in the left column graph the predicted probability of patenting in China but not in the US against the variable indicated; plots in the right column are for firms patenting in both China and the US. 95% confidence intervals of a fractional polynomial regression line are indicated in gray. We only use data for firms which do have a patent in the US and/or in China (post-1986, thus overwhelmingly SIPO patents) -these amount to 1,937 observations from 849 firms (around 3% of all firms in our sample Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported for each of the four groups of firms, where group affiliation is determined by patenting in the four years that make up the sample period for our regressions above. The patent stock variables indicate that some of these firms had patents in previous/other years (other than 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006) . Around 3.7% of observations (n = 2, 380) in our sample are for the 810 firms which took out a patent in the sample period, whereas 96.3% are for the 19,238 firms that did not patent. The data covers the years for which R&D expenditure is available (2001, 2002, 2005, 2006 Table 3 shows the resulting matching rates. In a third step, we define equivalent groups. a We then verify whether the matched sample contains the corresponding equivalents; for example, if a SIPO patent was matched and we find it to have a USPTO equivalent, we check whether the USPTO patent was also matched. If it was not matched, we verify the USPTO patent's assignee name and add it to the matched sample if it coincides with the assignee name of the SIPO patent. This third step ensures consistency between the USPTO and SIPO matches and adds a number of patents to our matched sample (see Table 3 ).
a We apply a definition that assigns patents into the same equivalent group if patents share the same priority documents. Notes: ZINB regressions for SIPO and USPTO patents were combined using seemingly unrelated regression, which yields the same parameter coefficients as in individual regressions but a joint variance-covariance matrix (clustering at the firm-level). We then test parameter homogeneity in count equations (and the excess zero/inflation equation in the ZINB case) indicated, reporting p-values for the H 0 of parameter homogeneity across models. We also tested groups of variables (grouping indicated by the symbols) jointly, with results for the H 0 of joint homogeneity reported. Notes: Results presented in columns [1] - [4] represent the regression coefficients from pooled regressions of log sales on all covariates listed. In each case (with exception of column [4] , see below) the result in the left column marked 'coeff' represents the coefficient for the 780,000 ASIE observations not contained in our matched ASIE-Oriana data, while the result in the right column marked '×sample' represents the coefficient for the 65,000 observations in our ASIE-Oriana matched sample (implemented via an interaction term × the covariate). It can be seen that for the vast majority of covariates the latter term is statistically significant: the ASIE-Oriana matched sample is not representative of the wider ASIE database. In column [4] we conduct a counterfactual experiment, at random selecting 65,000 observations to make up the 'pseudo' ASIE-Oriana matched sample. As can be seen for the vast majority of covariates the interaction terms are statistically insignificant, as one would expect from random sampling. Finally, in column [5] we simply regress each variable on an intercept (result in left column) and a dummy for the ASIE-Oriana matched sample (right column) -thus each reported line represents a separate regression of 841,394 observations. We term these regressions as 'unconditional' equality tests, whereas the results in the previous columns represent conditional equality tests.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
